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BOOK REVEW
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By WILLIAuM F. SWINDLER. Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969-70. Vol. I: pp. 458. $11.50. Vol. II:
pp. 579. $12.95.
It requires boldness to undertake a review of this two-volume work
by Professor Swindler of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at The
College of William and Mary. He has written a history of the nation's
constitutional development, centered on the constitutional interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, for the period 1889 through
1968, beginning with the Fuller Court and concluding with the Warren Court. This is a prodigious task, and it is evident that an extraordinary amount of research and devotion have gone into the effort. Professor Swindler has given us the fruit of a very rich and mature scholarship. The documentation and appendices as well as the understanding
and knowledgeability portrayed in the text leave no doubt concerning
the author's thoroughness of research and intimate acquaintance with
the materials. Apart from the text itself, the book contains some distinctive and valuable special features. Each of the volumes includes
five appendices: A-Brief biographical sketches of Court personnel during the period in question, including also the Attorneys General and
Solicitors General; B-Proposed constitutional amendments; C-Statutes
on the federal judiciary; D-Selected Acts of Congress; E-A concise
digest of the principal constitutional cases in chronological order. In
addition each volume includes a selected bibliography.
Although the main focus in these volumes is on the Supreme Court,
Professor Swindler has not confined himself to a treatment of the currents in the case law represented by its decisions. He has placed his
study of the Court in the context of the general political, and to some
extent social and economic, history of the nation, and in the context
of the relationship of the Court to the President and the Congress. The
result is that his account extends far beyond the formal legal materials.
A threshold observation is that Professor Swindler is gifted with an
extraordinarily lively and vivid style of writing. A one-time journalist
who turned to the law and has become a constitutional lawyer, historian,
and teacher, Professor Swindler's felicitous style of writing, well adapted
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to historical presentation, imparts a unique quality to these volumes.
This is one of the most interesting books written about the Supreme
Court and constitutional history that has appeared for some years, and
it is both engrossing and highly fascinating reading. This is high praise,
indeed, for a book dealing with legal matters and in part covering
ground others have already trod.
It is not possible within the confines of this review to do full justice
to Professor Swindler's two-volume work. At most this reviewer will
point up its general features and hopefully induce the reader to get a
first-hand acquaintance of his own.
The entire period treated by Professor Swindler, ranging from 1889
to 1968, breaks conveniently into two parts, each the subject of a separate volume. The first volume is subtitled "The Old Legality, 18891932," the second, "The New Legality, 1932-1968."
The use of these terms is understandable. Despite changes and occasional departures from the prevailing view, the period from 1889 to
1932 was generally marked by a conservatism in constitutional interpretation. It is enough to say that during this period the Court applied
both (a) a doctrine of dual federalism which operated to restrict the
legislative powers of the federal government and the states, and hampered the federal government in its attempt to deal with problems of
growing national importance, and (b) a rigorous interpretation of
substantive due process to protect property and economic liberty in
order to give constitutional sanction to the presuppositions of a laissezfaire order. The combination of restricted interpretation of federal
powers, particularly the commerce power, and the restraints imposed on
the legislative power to protect freedom of contract and property,
operated to give private business and industry a large constitutional
freedom in which to conduct their operations immune to effective public regulation. To be sure, there were some aberrations during the
period, and there were expectations of reform during the Wilson Administration, but these did not materialize, and the Court continued to

have a conservative majority through the early New Deal days. The
appointments of Justices Holmes and Brandeis and later Stone and
Cardozo did foreshadow changes of a substantial character, but these
changes were not achieved until the days of the Hughes Court.
The second volume begins with the advent of the New Deal, points
up the early defeats of the Administration at the hands of the still predominantly conservative Court, and then recounts the now familiar
story of the transformation which began after President Roosevelt pro-
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posed his Court packing bill. The almost unbroken story since then
is of the development of an interpretation which has abandoned dual
federalism and economic liberty as important constitutional values, and
has stressed as paramount the values which the Court finds central in
its understanding of a democratic society. This trend culminates in the
enlarged emphasis by the Warren Court on personal liberty, protection
of the accused, freedom from discrimination, freedom of expression and
the political rights which inhere in a democratic society. In breaking
down the successive periods of the Court's constitutional development,
the author, in his second volume, identifies the later Hughes Court with
release of legislative powers from the limitations placed upon it in the
earlier period, the Stone Court with a whole series of reinterpretations
to implement the new premises, and the Warren Court with a period
of extraordinary constitutional development which placed the emphasis
on personal liberty as the effective restraint on the expanded legislative
powers.
The story told by Professor Swindler is not new. What adds novelty
and special value to his treatment is that he puts this development in the
context of the total historical forces of the periods in question, including
the general political development, the differences between the major
political parties, and the relationship of the Court to Congress and the
President. The treatment of the extra-judicial factors and the fascinating
new historical data uncovered by the author impart a distinctive value
to these books.
Particularly helpful are the historical introductions to the several chapters which point up the political and social matrix for the judicial development. Mention may be made, for instance, of the chapters in
Volume I which give the background of the labor and agrarian movement which challenged the conservative order in the closing decades of
the last century. The chapter on the national experiment with prohibition and the forces behind the effort to deal with the problem by constitutional amendment is highly illuminating.
Some of the most interesting chapters in the book have to do with the
relations between the Supreme Court and the Congress and the President. With respect to the latter, the chief item of interest is the President's appointive power. Professor Swindler provides some very interesting vignettes of the political process at work in Supreme Court
appointments. Those persons who believe that political factors should
be excluded in appointments to this judicial office will be disappointed
to find the well documented portrayal of the political considerations
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which influence the Executive in making his choices. It is quite clear
that Presidents generally have attempted to appoint to the Supreme
Court men who would have the "right" point of view. This is understandable in view of the role played by the Supreme Court in constitutional policy-making and the authority with which it can inhibit legislative policies and interfere with presidential prerogative. One of the
most intriguing stories is that of the great influence Chief Justice Taft
exercised in the appointment of new associate justices to the Supreme
Court during the period of his incumbency. Probably the most exciting
and dramatic episode on the relationship of the President and the Court,
however, arose during the New Deal days when President Roosevelt
decided on the Court packing proposal as a means of infusing the Court
with new blood to get the kind of Court he wanted to review the New
Deal legislation. The story has been told before but Professor Swindler tells it again in a fascinating and dramatic way. It is evident that
President Roosevelt grossly miscalculated the temper of the country on
this matter, and it must be considered one of his great political mistakes.
But while losing the battle, he won the war, since it may be supposed
that this challenge to the Supreme Court played its part in the new interpretations which followed shortly thereafter.
The author devotes substantial attention to Congressional reaction to
the Supreme Court's decisions, particularly in the recent decades during
which a substantial part of Congress, incensed by the direction of the
Court's decisions, was resorting to various methods of curbing the Court.
Since the author is concerned with all of the organs and agencies that
contribute to constitutional development, and appreciates the role played
by advocates on both sides in shaping constitutional doctrine, he gives
due attention to the attorneys representing the governmental and opposing interests in key cases and the thrusts of their arguments. As he observes in a number of instances, the Court simply adopted arguments
advanced by counsel. The government frequently lost simply because
its position was poorly presented, while the competing private interests
were represented by some of the ablest counsel of the day.
A thoughtful and preceptive chapter in Volume II is devoted to a
discussion of the competing Black-Douglas and Frankfurter-Jackson
philosophies of judicial review. This is a particularly useful juxtaposition of persons and ideas since it represents the difference between the
activist and the self-restraint approaches to constitutional interpretation.
While the Frankfurter-Jackson philosophy goes back to Holmes, Brandeis and Stone and has a respectable pedigree, the main thrust of the
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Warren Court has been to give solid support to the Black-Douglas activism which sees judicial review as an opportunity and responsibility
to give effect to those values which the justices find central to our constitutional order. In light of the changes which have recently taken
place in the Court it seems probable that the activism which distinguished
the Warren Court will now be curbed and that the Court will be content with a more modest conception of its role.
If one thing emerges very clearly from the author's treatment of the
subject, it is that the Supreme Court is very much involved in politics
in the large sense. The Court deals basically with large political and
social policy questions, although they are wrapped up in the form of
legal problems and come before the Court as questions of constitutional
interpretation arising under language broad enough to admit of wide
differences in construction. Certainly, the varieties of construction that
have been given to the Constitution over the years suggests that there

is no fixed interpretation. The trend of interpretation at any one time
is a cyclical affair which may mark the response of a given set of justices, with their own conception of constitutional values, to any given
problem in the setting of that day. The dominant social and economic
philosophy of the day and the value preferences of individual justices
play a compelling role in constitutional interpretation.
The Court has considered itself emancipated from stare decisis,
and that it is free to serve as a continuing constitutional convention if it
regards its task as that of accommodating the Constitution to new forces
in American life and of serving as an organ for voicing the changes in
the national conscience. One may question this approach, and whether
basic shifts in constitutional policy should not be the responsibility of
the organs of government directly responsible to the people, who are
the ultimate source of constitutional power.
Professor Swindler states that he has attempted to be as objective as
possible but, as he admits, his own point of view is well manifest in the

book. It is evident that he views with considerable approval if not enthusiasm all the developments of recent years which, in his opinion, have
marked the maturing of our constitutional interpretation. This maturity
gives us what he calls the new federalism, with its emphasis on the
breadth of legislative power and its concern with the protection of individual rights. On the whole his own approval of this course of liberal
interpretation does not detract from the soundness of the book, though

he may not always do full justice to the critics of the Court's activist
role. In his evaluation of constitutional arguments there is an occasional
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slip, for instance, when he says that the argument that Congress had no
power of its own to outlaw the poll tax for federal elections was specious
or at least tenuous.' This is a casual treatment of the important constitutional question whether the power of Congress to regulate time, place
and manner of elections carries with it the authority to prescribe qualifications. Indeed it has been only recently that the Court dealt with
this question. 2 On the whole, however, the book is accurate in its portrayal of the cases and their results. Again, it should be kept in mind
that the author is concerned with the broad sweep of history and does
not purport to present a text on constitutional law.
The author comes to the conclusion that the Court has finally given
expression to the promise of the Constitution, but this formulation avoids
basic questions since it rests on assumptions both as to what the Constitution intended and the role of the Court in the constitutional system.
Whatever admiration may be felt for the conclusions reached by the
activist Warren Court, it should not obscure the consideration that it
too has been reading things into the Constitution, and that the results
now reached under equal protection are no more compelled or required
than those reached in an earlier day through interpretation of the due
process clause.
It is quite clear that Professor Swindler views with approval the rise
of what he calls the new federalism, which as far as this writer can tell
is a term designed to describe a structure of government in which the
states play a modest, subordinate role and are subject to extensive control
by both the Congress and the Supreme Court. If it is federalism at all
it is of a highly diluted form. But perhaps we have reached the stage of
our national development where federalism as a constitutional division
of authority is no longer a viable proposition. In any event, it was not
the writer's function in this case to write a treatise on federalism and its
continual usefulness in our constitutional system. He has faithfully
written the story on the collapse of federalism in the recent decades and
this is enough for his purpose.
These are books of extraordinary value, large in their conception,
superb in their execution, rich in their scholarship and perception. They
are a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject, and deserve
wide attention and a large audience.
PA-L G. KAuPER*
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